The Explanatory Problem of Law’s Normativity: A Proposal Based on Practical Attitudes and Normative Statuses

The aim of this article is to analyse the explanatory problem of law’s normativity and to provide a novel solution to it. In a nutshell, this is not a practical problem, but a theoretical problem that consists in distinguishing, explaining and relating two common claims taken as ascertained: that the law is both a matter of facts and a mat- ter of norms. The strategy of this work begins by distinguishing three fundamental problems, which I consider are implicit in the problem of law’s normativity: the in- finite regress of interpretations, the gerrymandering, and the individual criterion. It continues by offering a satisfactory answer to each of them. It then ends by showing how the explanatory problem of law’s normativity can be solved. The solution ap- peals to three distinctions, four technical notions, and three conditions of adequacy to explain general normativity, which are crucial to distinguish, explain and relate, in an adequate manner, the factual and the normative dimensions of law.