Market discipline in the Latin American banking system: Testing depositor discipline, borrower discipline, and the internal capital market hypothesis

Edgar Demetrio Tovar-García

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper tests the existence of market discipline in the Latin American banking system using a variety of methods. It re-examines traditional tests on depositor discipline, controlling banks’ internal capital demand. In addition, it explores whether borrowers discipline bank risk-taking. This new hypothesis points out that low-quality banks issue fewer loans and charge lower interests rates. Contrary to the general view, our findings suggest weak presence of market discipline. These results are robust to different indicators of the key explanatory variables and econometric methods. For policymakers, this implies a necessity to restore market discipline following the Basel Accord.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)78-90
Number of pages13
JournalSpanish Review of Financial Economics
Volume15
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2017

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Market discipline
Banking system
Testing
Internal capital markets
Bank risk taking
Basel Accord
Charge
Interest rates
Loans
Econometric methods
Politicians

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Market discipline in the Latin American banking system : Testing depositor discipline, borrower discipline, and the internal capital market hypothesis. / Tovar-García, Edgar Demetrio.

In: Spanish Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2, 01.01.2017, p. 78-90.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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